We demonstrate that the Byzantine Agreement (detectable broadcast) is also solvable in the continuous-variable scenario with multipartite entangled Gaussian states and Gaussian operations (homodyne detection). Within this scheme we find that Byzantine Agreement requires a minimum amount of entanglement in the multipartite states used in order to achieve a solution. We discuss realistic implementations of the protocol, which consider the possibility of having inefficient homodyne detectors, not perfectly correlated outcomes, and noise in the preparation of the resource states. The proposed protocol is proven to be robust and efficiently applicable under such non-ideal conditions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An algorithm is commonly defined as a set of rules for solving a problem in a finite number of steps. One of the aims of quantum information is to provide new protocols and algorithms which exploit quantum resources to find a solution to problems which either lack a solution using classical resources or the solution is extremely hard to implement. The term "Byzantine Agreement" was originally coined by Lamport & Fischer [1] in the context of computer science to analyze the problem of fault tolerance when a faulty processor is sending inconsistent information to other processors. In a cryptographic context, it refers to distributed protocols in which some of the participants might have malicious intentions and could try to sabotage the distributed protocol inducing the honest parties to take contradictory actions between them. This problem is often reformulated in terms of a Byzantine army where there is a general commander who sends the order of attacking or retreating to each one of his lieutenants. Those can also communicate pairwise to reach a common decision concerning attacking or retreating, knowing that there might be traitors among them including the general commander. A traitor could create fake messages to achieve that different parts of the army attack while others retreat, which would put the army at a great disadvantage. The question hence is whether there exists a protocol among all the officials involved that, after its termination, satisfies the following conditions: The commanding general sends an order to his N − 1 lieutenants such that: (i) all loyal lieutenant obey the same order (ii) if the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends. It is assumed that the parties cannot share any previous setup. Lamport et al. [2] proved that if the participants only shared pairwise secure classical channels, then Byzantine Agreement or broadcast is only possible if and only if t < n/3 where n is the number of players and t is the number of traitors among them. In [3] Fitzi and coworkers introduced a weaker nevertheless important version of Byzantine Agreement known as detectable broadcast. Detectable broadcast is said to be achieved if the protocol satisfies the following conditions: (i) if no player is corrupted, then the protocol achieves broadcast and (ii) if one or more players are corrupted, then either the protocol achieves Byzantine Agreement or all honest players abort the protocol. Thus, in a detectable broadcast protocol, cheaters can force the protocol to abort, i.e. no action is taken. In such cases all honest players agree on aborting the protocol so that contradictory actions between the honest players are avoided. In the same paper [3] , Fitzi, Gisin and Maurer [3] devised a solution to the detectable broadcast problem using multipartite entanglement as a quantum resource. Later on Fitzi et al. [4] and Iblisdir and Gisin [5] showed that a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol, which guarantees a private sequences of classical data shared between pairs of parties, suffices to solve detectable broadcast. This situation is reminiscent of quantum cryptography, in which two seemingly independent main schemes exist for QKD, the prepare-and-measure Bennett and Brassart 1984 (BB84) scheme [6] which does not use entangled states shared between Alice and Bob, and the Ekert 1991 (Ekert91) scheme [7] where indeed entanglement is explicitly distributed and the security is guaranteed by Bell's theorem. However, the two schemes have been shown to be completely equivalent [8] , and specifically entanglement stands as a precondition for any secure key distribution [9] .
Detectable broadcast might be regarded in a similar view as quantum key distribution and, arguably, the same reasoning applies to the different protocols advanced for its solution, making explicit or implicit use of multipartite entanglement. In this paper, we adopt an approach of the Ekert91, guided by the physical motivation of studying the performance and the usefulness of multipartite entangled states as operational resources to achieve detectable broadcast. While protocols for this task exist for qutrits [3] and qubits [10, 11] , in this paper we investigate the possibility of solving detectable broadcast with continuous-variable (CV) systems [12, 13] , namely with Gaussian states and performing Gaussian operations only. The motivations for this approach are manifold. On the practical side, the recent progress in CV QKD [14] has shown that the use of efficient homodyne detectors, compared to photon counters employed in BB84 schemes, enables the distribution of secret keys at faster rates over increasingly long distances [15] . On the theoretical side, multipartite entanglement is a central concept whose understanding and characterization (especially in high-dimensional and CV systems), despite recent efforts, is far from being complete. It is important, therefore, to approach this task operationally, i.e. by connecting entanglement to the success or to the performance of diverse quantum information and communication tasks [16] , while exploiting the differences between discrete-variable and CV scenarios. For Gaussian states of light fields, which are presently the theoretical and experimental pillars of quantum information with CVs [12, 13, 17] , an important result in this respect is due to van Loock and Braunstein [18] . They introduced a scheme to produce fully symmetric (permutation-invariant) n-mode Gaussian states exhibiting genuine multipartite entanglement. Furthermore, they devised a communication protocol, the "quantum teleportation network," for the distribution of quantum states exploiting such resources, which has been experimentally demonstrated for n = 3 [19] . The optimal fidelity characterizing the performance of such a protocol yields an operational quantification of genuine multipartite entanglement in symmetric Gaussian states. This quantification is equivalent to the information-theoretic "residual contangle" measure, a Gaussian entanglement monotone, emerging from the monogamy of quantum correlations [20, 21] . Other applications of multipartite Gaussian entanglement have been advanced and demonstrated, and the reader may find more details in [12, 13] , as well as in the two more recent complementary reviews [17] (theoretical) and [22] (experimental). In this respect, the usage of multipartite entangled Gaussian resources for the Byzantine Agreement problem was, to the best of our knowledge, not previously investigated.
Here we propose a protocol to solve detectable broadcast with symmetric multimode entangled Gaussian states and homodyne detection. This provides an alternative interpretation of multipartite Gaussian entanglement as a resource enabling this kind of secure communication. We concentrate on the case of three parties, and remarkably find that not all three-mode symmetric entangled Gaussian states are useful to achieve a solution: To solve detectable broadcast there is a minimum threshold in the multipartite entanglement. This is at variance with the two-party QKD counterpart: In there, all twomode entangled Gaussian states are useful to obtain a secure key using Gaussian operations [23] . We eventually discuss how our protocol can be implemented in realistic conditions, namely considering detectors with finite efficiency and yielding not perfectly matched measurement outcomes, and Gaussian resources which are not ideally pure, but possibly (as it is in reality) affected by a certain amount of thermal noise. We show that under these premises the protocol is still efficiently applicable to provide a robust solution to detectable broadcast over a broad range of the involved parameters (noise, entanglement, measurement outcomes, and uncertainties), paving the way towards a possible experimental demonstration in a quantum optical setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we outline the steps needed to solve detectable broadcast in the discrete scenario following [3, 10] . In Sec. III, we first review briefly the basic tools needed to describe multipartite Gaussian states and measurements. Building on the ideas presented in Section II we construct a protocol adapted to the continuous-variable case. In Sec. IV we discuss security on the distribution of quantum states for the protocol. Section V is devoted to analyze the effects of malicious manipulations of the data by dishonest parties and its detection by the honest ones. In Sec. VI we focus on the efficiency of the proposed protocol and we extend our results to a realistic practical scenario, relaxing the conditions for obtaining of correlated outputs between the players and assuming noise in the preparation of the input states. Finally, in Sec. VII we present our concluding remarks.
II. DETECTABLE BROADCAST PROTOCOL
The protocols to solve detectable broadcast using entanglement as a resource are based on three differentiated steps:
(i) Distribution of the quantum states,
(ii) Test of the distributed states, (iii) Protocol by itself.
Step (iii) is fundamentally classical, since it uses the outputs of the different measurements of the quantum states to simulate a particular random generator ("primitive"). Let us consider the simplest case, in which only three parties are involved. They are traditionally denoted by S (the sender, i.e. commander general) and the receivers R 0 and R 1 , and at most, only one is a traitor. In this case, the primitive generates for every invocation a random permutation of the elements {0, 1, 2} with uniform distribution, i.e. (t S , t R0 , t R1 ) ∈ {(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0)}. In this primitive, no single player n can learn more about the permutation than the value t n (n = {S, R 0 , R 1 }) which she or he, receives i.e., each player ignores how the other two values are assigned to the other players. Furthermore, nobody else (besides the parties) have access to the sequences.
Entanglement is used in the protocol to distribute classical private random variables with a specific correlation between the players, in such a way that any malicious manipulation of the data can be detected by all honest parties allowing them to abort the protocol. In the discrete variable case such a primitive can be implemented with qutrits using e.g. Aharonov states |A = 1 √ 6
(|0, 1, 2 +|1, 2, 0 +|2, 0, 1 −|0, 2, 1 −|1, 0, 2 −|2, 1, 0 ). This choice allows the distribution and test part to be secure (for details see [3] ). Whenever the three qutrits are all measured in the same basis, all three results are different. Hence -after discarding all the states used for the testing of the distributed states [step (ii)] -the players are left with a sequence of L outputs that reproduces the desired primitive. We schematically represent this primitive by the table below. (iii-4): If c i =⊥, then player R i knows that S is dishonest, the other player is honest and accepts his flag. (iii-5): If both R 0 and R 1 claim to have consistent data but c 0 = c 1 , player R 1 demands from R 0 to send him all the indices k ∈ J 0 for which R 0 has the results 1 − c 0 . R 1 checks now that (i) all indices k from R 0 are not in J 1 and (ii) the output R 1 obtains from indices k correspond to the value 2. If this is the case, R 1 concludes that R 0 is honest and changes his flag to c 0 . If not, R 1 knows that R 0 is dishonest and he keeps his flag to c 1 . Detectable broadcast is in this way achieved.
III. CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE PRIMITIVE
Before describing in detail how to achieve the primitive presented in the above section in the CV set up, let us briefly review the most basic ingredients needed to describe Gaussian states [12, 17] . We consider here quantum systems of n canonical degrees of freedom, often called modes, associated to a Hilbert space H = L 2 (ℜ 2n ). The commutation relations fulfilled by the canonical coordinatesR T = (X 1 ,P 1 , . . . ,X n ,P n ) = (R 1 . . . ,R 2n ) are represented in matrix form by the symplectic matrix J:
. . , 2n, and
Gaussian states are, by definition, completely described by their first and second moments. Hence, rather than describing them by their (infinite-dimensional) density matrixρ, one can use the Wigner function representation
which is a function of the first moments through the displacement vector d (a 2n real vector), and of the second moments through the covariance matrix γ (a 2n×2n symmetric real matrix). Here ζ ∈ R 2n is a phase-space vector. The positivity condition ofρ implies that γ+iJ n ≥ 0.
Following the discussion of the protocol [step (iii)] for the discrete case, we choose to use as a resource a pure, fully inseparable tripartite Gaussian stateρ a , completely symmetric under the interchange of the modes [18] , whose covariance matrix γ(a) accepts the following parametrization [24] :
with a ≥ 1 and
The condition for full inseparability (truly multipartite entanglement) across the 1 × 1 × 1 mode partition comes from the nonpositivity of the partial transpose (NPTcriteria) and reads [24] :
is fully inseparable as soon as a > 1. Quantitatively, the genuine tripartite entanglement of the states of Eq. (3), as measured by the residual contangle [21] , is a monotonically increasing function of a and diverges for a → ∞.
So far γ(a) appears as the "equivalent" CV version of the discrete Aharonov state |A , i.e. fully inseparable and completely symmetric under exchange of the three players. One is tempted to infer, therefore, that the discussed primitive of the discrete case can be straightforwardly generalized to the continuous one. A standard way of transforming the correlations of the shared entangled quantum statesρ a into a sequence of classically correlated data between the 3 players is to perform a homodyne measurement of the quadratures of each mode. Denoting byX S ,X R0 ,X R1 the position (or momentum) operator of each mode, and by x S , x R0 , x R1 the output of the respective measurement, the players can communicate classically with each other and agree, for instance, only on those values for which either |x S | = |x R0 | = |x R1 | = {0, x 0 } with x 0 > 0. In this way each player can associate the logical trit (t = 0, 1, 2) to a null, positive, or negative result, respectively. The probability distribution that measuring the quadraturesX S , X R0 ,X R1 produces an outcome t S = j, t R0 = k, t R1 = l, with (j, k, l) ∈ {0, 1, 2} and uncertainty σ is given by:
describes the separable state of the 3 modes obtained after each party has measured its corresponding quadrature and obtained an output j, k, l. Thus, the state of the system after the measure can be described by a fully separable covariance matrix γ M ,
where each party has a pure one-mode Gaussian state with covariance matrix
and displacement vector d T m = (−|x 0 |, 0). On the other hand W a is the Wigner function of the initial tripartite entangled stateρ a described by γ(a) and d.
Since Gaussian states are symmetric with respect to their displacement vector, it is easy to see that a mapping into classical trits such that all possible outputs {0, 1, 2} occur with the same probability is not possible. Therefore, the primitive discussed in the discrete case must be modified when adapted to the CV scenario. The way we find to overcome this asymmetry of the output's probabilities relies on joining the correlations from pairs of quantum states. First we map the quantum correlations involved in each single quantum state just to classical bits by a "sign binning" (as in CV QKD [23] ). That is, first we keep only the results for which the three players obtain a coincident output |x S | = |x R0 | = |x R1 | = x 0 > 0, and associate the logical bit b n = 0(1), where n = {S, R 0 , R 1 }, to positive (negative) value of the coincident quadrature x 0 (−x 0 ). In every measurement the sender makes public his outcome result |x 0 |, whatever the output is, but not its sign in such a way that in principle all states are going to be used in the protocol. Second, we construct a primitive consisting of a random permutation of the elements (i, j, k) ∈ {(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}. Compulsory for the implementation of the primitive is that every element of the primitive appears with equal probability and any other combination of the outputs not regarded by the primitive is exceedingly small compared to the allowed permutations. In other words, we demand that p ≡ P(0, 1, 1) = P(1, 0, 1) = P(1, 1, 0), and, denoting by δ ≡ P(else), we require that the corresponding conditional probabilities,
If the above conditions are met, it is possible then by invoking two consecutive times the previous generator [i.e. using a pair of quantum states of the class Eq. (3)], to map the bit values to trit-values (0,1,2) plus an additional undesired element "u". For instance, the players, after keeping only those bits obtained by coincident quadrature outputs ±x 0 , use two consecutive bits m and m + 1 for the following association:
Thus, by concatenating two invocations, one generates the permutations corresponding to the primitive {(0, 1, 2), (0, 2, 1), (1, 0, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0)} plus a permutation of undesired elements (u, 2, 2), (2, u, 2), (2, 2, u) which will be discarded during the protocol. With all these tools at hand, optimal results for the desired probabilities are achieved for a displacement vector of the form
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), and yield:
with coefficients
, and prefactor
The probability distribution depends on the parameters a, x 0 and σ. In the case a ≫ 1, it can be seen that the conditional probabilities satisfy the following:
In the limit of a perfect, zerouncertainty homodyne detection (σ → 0),p converges exactly to 1/3. In general, there exists a large region in the parameters space for whichp → 1 3 andδ i → 0, as depicted in Fig. 1 .
However, there is a lower bound on the entanglement content of the symmetric Gaussian states of Eq. (3) in order to fulfill the above conditions. Only for a ≥ a thresh ≡ 5 √ 2 6 ≈ 1.18, one has thatp >δ i , which is a necessary condition to implement the primitive. This indicates that not all pure three-mode symmetric full entangled Gaussian states can be successfully employed to solve detectable broadcast via our protocol. This entanglement threshold is an a priori bound which does not depend on the specific form of the employed resource states. For any parametrization of the covariance matrix ofρ a , which is obtainable from γ(a) by local unitary squeezing transformations (hence at fixed amount of tripartite entanglement), the same condition discriminating useful resource states is analytically recovered. We remark that this bound becomes tight in the limit x 0 → ∞, meaning that a ≥ a thresh becomes necessary and sufficient for the successful implementation of the primitive. 
IV. DISTRIBUTION AND TEST
We move now to the distribution & test part of the protocol which represents the first step in the execution of the appropriate primitive and has only two possible outputs: Global success or global failure. In the case of failure, a player assumes that something went wrong during the execution of the protocol and aborts any further action. In the case of global success, each of the parties ends up with a set {K} of classical data, and the protocol proceeds classically, according to the steps explained in Section II.
From now on we assume that the players share pairwise secure classical channels and secure (noiseless) quantum channels. The secure distribution & test part uses correlations to validate the fairness of the other parties. Therefore, quantum states are sent through noiseless quantum channels and measures are performed massively. In doing so, it is possible to detect manipulation of the data on a statistical basis and abort the protocol if necessary. In this Section we mostly focus on the issue of security in the distribution and security test of the data. This should permit the detection of any malicious manipulation of the data. The explicit effects of sabotage actions will be reported in Section V. We postpone the important issue of how well the protocol will succeed in the case that the outputs of the measurements are not perfectly correlated to Section VI. The reader not interested in the detailed description of the distribution & test part can skip the rest of this section and jump to Section V or VI instead.
The distribution & test part proceeds as follows: (i-1) Without losing generality, let us assume that R 1 prepares a large number, M , of tripartite systems in statê ρ a (i.e. with covariance matrix γ(a) and displacement d) and sends one subsystem to S and another to R 0 .
(i-2) R 1 wants to check if the distribution of states is faithfully achieved. To this aim she or he chooses randomly a set of indices for player S, {K S }, and a disjoint set of indices for player R 0 , {K R0 }, and sends these two sets over secure classical channels to the corresponding players. Player S sends his or her {K S } subsystems to player R 0 . For each m ∈ {K S }, R 0 measures the two subsystems in his or her possession and R 1 measures his subsystem. After communication of their results over secure classical channels, they agree on those indices {K S } ⊆ K S for which |x R0 | = |x R1 | = x 0 . R 1 and R 0 check now whether the correlations predicted by the primitive occur:p =P(011) =P(101) =P(110) = 1 3 , δ = 0. If the test was successful, i.e. if the measurement results were consistent with the assumption that the states have been distributed correctly, the players i ∈ {R 0 , R 1 } set the flag f i = 1, otherwise f i = 0. In an analogous way, the test is performed for S. (i-3) Players S, R 0 and R 1 send their flags to each other. Every player who receives a flag "0", sets his flag also to "0". Every player with flag "0" aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the execution of the protocol proceeds. This step terminates the distribution & test of the quantum systems.
In the second phase of the protocol a selection of the distributed systems is chosen to establish the bit sequences which will be used to implement the quantum primitive. In this phase, again honest parties may abort the protocol if malicious manipulations occur. is secret to party j, i.e. player R 1 has no information whatsoever about the set L
R0
S . An analogous procedure is adopted by R 0 and R 1 .
(ii-3) After measuring their whole sequence of subsystems, player i ∈ {S, R 0 , R 1 } announces publicly, the set of indices {M m i } ∈M i for which the output of the quadrature measurement was |x 0 | The order in which the players announce their measurement results can be specified initially and based, e.g. on a rotation principle. (Notice that the announcement of |x i | = x 0 during the actual measurement phase would make possible an effective traitor strategy, since he could manipulate combinations on a systematic basis).
(ii-4) Without loss of generality, let us explicitly describe this step of protocol for player S. for i ∈ {0, 1} be the index set for which the player S measured ±x 0 twice. Analogously to the first phase of the protocol, player S can test if the outputs of his measures agree with the correlations of a proper primitive (p(00) = p(10) = p(01) = 1/3 and p(11) = 0) If the test is successful, the player sets his flag f S = 1, otherwise f S = 0. The same procedure is analogously performed by R 0 and R 1 . From this step on, the players deal exclusively with the outputs of their measures, i.e. classical data and secure classical channels. (ii-6): From a randomly chosen set V S ⊂M player S demands from R 0 and R 1 their measurement results. S tests this control sample for the assumed primitive. If the test is successful, S sets his flag f S = 1, otherwise f S = 0. R 0 (R 1 ) perform this step with a set V R0 ⊂M \V
Every player with a flag 0 aborts the execution of the protocol. Otherwise the players agree upon a set
as the result of the invocation of the primitive, which consists in an even number of elements. This step concludes the distribution part of the protocol.
V. ERROR ESTIMATION
We examine here two possible sources of error, which can occur during the implementation of the primitive with Gaussian states. While the first source is inherent to the system, the second is caused by an active adversary intervention of a participating party. The inherent error is caused by the occurrence of non consistent combinations on the invocation of the primitive, that is, the occurrence of outputs (1, 1, 1), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0) has to be considered. This error will propagate along the protocol, so that the probability of finding a combination which is not appropriate is bounded from above from η = 1 − (3p) 2 . The second source of errors we want to discuss here corresponds to the local actions that one of the players could do in order to manipulate the measurement results of other players. For instance, let us assume that the player R 0 has malicious intentions and wants to shift the local component of the displacement vector of the distributed state using local transformations. Note that a shift of the quadrature output x 0 , provides the same error in the probability distribution of the outputs as a shift in the corresponding displacement vector. In other words, both types of manipulations produce the same change in the probabilities as calculated in Eq. (6) . Parameterizing the shift in the displacement vector by the parameter K,
, it is interesting to see how that affects the conditional probabilitiesp andδ. If probabilities were changed, player R 0 could try to determine [via subsequent communication with the other players (step ii-3)], with certain probability, the occurrence of the outputs of the other players, thereby gaining additional information. Notice also that S and R 1 cannot realize the local manipulation of R 0 without classi-cal communication between them. This can be trivially seen by realizing that the partial trace Tr R0 (ρ a (γ,
Thus the most plausible strategy for a traitor could consist of the following: (i) Discrediting honest players by manipulating the displacement vector in such a way that non consistent combinations appear, (ii) hide successful measurements to the honest players which result in combinations that might be disadvantageous. It is tedious but straightforward to show that by making use of the test steps (ii-4)-(ii-6) honest parties can detect the effects of such manipulations.
VI. EFFICIENT REALISTIC IMPLEMENTATION
The protocol, as discussed in the previous Sections, constitutes a nice proof-of-principle of the fact that detectable broadcast is solvable in the CV scenario using multipartite Gaussian entanglement. However, it suffers from its reliance on two main idealizations which render the practical implementation of the primitive unrealistic, or, better said, endowed with zero efficiency. Specifically, we have requested that (i) a pure tripartite symmetric Gaussian state is distributed as the entangled resource; and (ii) when the three parties measure (via homodyne detection) the position of their respective modes, their measurement is taken to be ideal, that is not affected by any uncertainty, and moreover all parties must obtain, up to a sign, the same outcome x 0 . In reality, assumption (i) is unjustified as inevitable imperfections and losses result instead in the production of mixed, thermalized states; on the other hand, the probability associated to (ii), and hence the probability of achieving broadcast, is vanishingly small [25] . It is interesting, in view of potential practical implementations of our scheme, to study here how its success is affected, and possibly guaranteed, by relaxing the above two assumptions.
To deal with (i), let us recall that the tripartite entangled Gaussian states of Eq. (3) can be produced in principle by letting three independently squeezed beams (one in momentum, and two in position) interfere at a double beam splitter, or "tritter" [26] , as proposed by van Loock and Braunstein [18] . In practice, the parametric nonlinear process employed to squeeze the vacuum is affected by losses which result in the actual generation of squeezed thermal states in each single mode. Before the tritter, one then has three independent Gaussian modes with covariance matrices γ in 1 (s, n) = diag{ns, n/s}, γ in 2 (s, n) = γ in 3 (s, n) = diag{n/s, ns}, respectively, where s = exp(2r) (with |r| the squeezing degree in each single mode) and n ≥ 1 is the noise parameter affecting each mode. The noise n is related to the initial marginal purity µ in k of each single mode by n = 1/µ in k [27] , and corresponds to a mean number of thermal photons given byn th = (n − 1)/2. For n = 1, each mode is in the ideally pure squeezed vacuum state. After the tritter operation, described by the symplectic matrix [18, 26, 28] 
the output covariance matrix of the three modes is given precisely by
where γ(a) is defined in Eq. (3) and we have made the identification a = [(s 2 + 2)/(3s)]. Eq. (13) describes generally mixed, fully symmetric three-mode Gaussian states, with global purity given by µ = n −3 , thus reducing to the pure instance of Eq. (3) for n = µ = 1. Recall that any additional losses due e.g. to an imperfect tritter and/or to the distribution and transmission of the three beams can be embedded into the initial single-mode noise factor n, so that Eq. (13) provides a realistic description of the states produced in experiments [19, 29] . We therefore consider this more general family of Gaussian states as resources to implement the CV version of the primitive. It may be interesting to recall that also for the general family of states of Eq. (13) the genuine tripartite entanglement is exactly computable [28] in terms of the residual contangle [21] , and as expected, it increases with a and decreases with n.
Concerning the idealization (ii) discussed above, for an efficient implementation we should first consider the realistic case of nonideal homodyne detections, which means that the outcomes are affected by uncertainties quantified by the parameter σ, see Eq. (6). Furthermore, we should let the parties measure within a finite range, which means specifically that in each measurement run the expected values for the measurement outcomes of the receivers can be shifted of some quantity ∆ with respect to the corresponding expectation value of the sender's homodyne detection. So, what we should ask for is that the parties (one sender S and two receivers R 0 and R 1 ) agree on those outcomes of their measurement results for which |x S | = x 0 > 0 and |x R0 | = |x R1 | = (x 0 + ∆) > 0, once the sender has announced his or her output results x 0 to the other two parties. Here, the actual results of each measurement are assumed to distribute according to a Gaussian function centered at x 0 (for the sender) and x 0 + ∆ (for the receivers), respectively, with a variance σ. Now the associated events occur with a finite probability. We wish to investigate for which range of the positive shift ∆ ∈ [∆ min , ∆ max ], being ∆ max −∆ min the range, the conditional probabilityp still approaches 1/3. The wider such range, the higher the probability of success, or efficiency, of the protocol; of course the regions in the space of parameters such that the primitive can be efficiently implemented will depend on the specific boundaries ∆ min and ∆ max and not only on their difference. Notice that in order to ensure that the sign of the quadratures does not change when allowing a finite range of valid output values (and therefore, correlations between classical bits are properly extracted (see Sec. III)), we always demand the shift ∆ to be positive. This condition can be further relaxed allowing for a non-symmetric range of permitted values around the broadcasted value x 0 . This extra condition, which could be straightforwardly included in our expressions if one aims at maximizing the efficiency of our protocol, does not modify the analysis of the realistic implementation of the protocol we perform in this Section. For the sake of clarity, we remark once again the role of the parameter ∆: Allowing a nonzero shift ∆ in the computation of the probabilityp, means considering the realistic case in which the outcomes of the measurements performed by each receiver can be not coincident with each other, and not coincident even with the corresponding broadcasted value of |x 0 |. In what follows we show that the protocol can be run successfully provided that the deviations |x R0 | − |x S | and |x R1 | − |x S | (in each run) both lie in between a ∆ min and a ∆ max , which will be determined.
To this aim, we can perform an analysis similar to the one of Section III, but considering in full generality a non-unit noise factor n, a non-zero uncertainty σ, and a non-zero shift ∆. The calculations of the probabilities follow straightforwardly along the lines of the special (unrealistic) case previously discussed, and we finally obtaiñ
with R = √ 9a 2 − 8. We find that in the parameter space of a (regulating the entanglement), n (regulating the mixedness), x 0 (regulating the measurement outcome), σ (regulating the measurement uncertainty), and ∆ (regulating the measurement shift), there exists a surface which acts as the boundary for the regime in which our primitive can be faithfully implemented, yielding a feasible, robust solution to the broadcast problem. This surface is obtained by requiring thatp = 1/3−ǫ, with the deficit ǫ chosen arbitrarily small. The result is plotted in Fig. 2 for ǫ = 10 −7 in the three-dimensional space of parameters x 0 / √ n, ∆/ √ n, and a, for different values of σ.
We consider the primitive as efficiently implementable in the whole region such that 1/3 − ǫ ≤p ≤ 1/3, which spans the volume above the surface of Fig. 2 . Notice that for σ = 0, n = 1, and ∆ max → ∆ min → 0, such a useful volume shrinks to a two-dimensional slice (with a ≥ 5 √ 2/6) which represents the parameter range in which the "ideal" implementation described in Sec. III is successful.
The figure offers several reading keys. Let us investigate independently how the possibility of solving detectable broadcast via our protocol depends on the individual parameters. For simplicity, we will consider n fixed and eventually discuss its role. We will also for the moment keep the idealization of error-free homodyne measurements (σ = 0), corresponding to Fig. 2(a) : this makes the subsequent discussion more tractable. However we will relax such an assumption in the end to show that a realistic description of the homodyne measurement does not significantly affect the performance and the applicability of the protocol. This validates the claims of efficiency that we make in the following.
Let us henceforth start with the dependence of the solution on a. Somehow surprisingly, there exist lower and upper bounds on the tripartite entanglement such that only for a min ≤ a ≤ a max the protocol achieves a solution. The bounds naturally depend on x 0 and ∆. Specifically, we observe that a min diverges for ∆ = 0 and x 0 → 0, meaning that no feasible solution can be achieved in the low-∆, low-x 0 regime; the reason being that near x 0 = 0 there is not possibility of associating the classical bits "0" and "1" to positive/negative values of the quadrature. The lower bound then goes down reducing to the already devised threshold of a thresh ≡ 5 √ 2/6 for ∆ close to zero and x 0 ≫ 0, and eventually converges to a = 1 (i.e. all entangled states are useful) for any finite x 0 ≫ 0 and ∆ → ∞. On the other hand, the upper bound on a, which surprisingly rules out states with too much entanglement, is obviously diverging at ∆ = 0 but becomes finite and relevant in the regime of small x 0 and large ∆, eventually reducing to 3/2 for any finite x 0 and ∆ → ∞.
Summarizing, the two extremal regimes corresponding to ∆ = 0 on the one hand and ∆ → ∞ on the other hand, both allow a solution of detectable broadcast via our protocol: The main difference is that in the former case one needs states with an entanglement above a min = 5 √ 2/6, while in the latter case one needs states whose entanglement is below a max = 3/2. The regime of finite shift ∆ interpolates between these two limits. This means, in terms of useful range, and hence of efficient implementations, that if one is able to produce entangled states precisely with 5 √ 2/6 < a < 3/2, the protocol is implementable with high efficiency for any shift ∆ ∈ [0, ∞) in the measurement outcomes. i.e. with an infinite range of variability allowed for the acceptable data resulting from homodyne detections performed by the receivers, for a given outcome x 0 of the sender. This information is important in view of practical implementations, and becomes especially valuable since the engineering of the required entangled resources appears feasible: A squeezing between 4.5 and 6 dB is required in each single mode, which is currently achieved in optical experiments [30] . Fig. 2(a) , alternatively, shows that for a fixed entangled resource, a, there exist minimum thresholds both for x 0 and ∆ in order to achieve a solution to detectable broadcast. While the useful range for x 0 is always unbounded from above, we find that, interestingly, an upper bound ∆ max exists for a > 3/2. Precisely, for a given a > 3/2, with increasing x 0 we observe that ∆ min decreases and ∆ max increases, i.e. the useful range spanned by ∆ widens. Conversely, at a given x 0 , ∆ max decreases with increasing entanglement a, reducing the parameter space in which a solution can be found. Consistently with the previous discussion, we conclude again that in realistic conditions (∆ > 0) it is better to have a moderate amount of shared entanglement to solve broadcast with optimal chances. Now, let us note that the noise parameter n simply induces a rescaling of both x 0 and ∆, in such a way that with increasing n the surface bounding the useful range of parameters shrinks, as it could be guessed (the noise degrades the performance of the protocol). Still, with typical noise factors characterizing experimental implementations, e.g. n = 2, the protocol appears very robust and the solution is still achievable, for a given amount of entanglement (say a 3/2), provided that x 0 and ∆ exceed √ 2 times their respective minimum thresholds obtained for ideally pure resources (n = 1).
Finally, let us address the important issue of the uncertainty affecting homodyne detections. Any realistic measurement is characterized by a nonzero σ. We have explicitly studied two situations, one in which the absolute error is fixed, corresponding to a constant σ [see Fig. 2(b) ], and another in which the relative error is fixed, corresponding to a σ proportional to the measurement outcome x 0 [see Fig. 2(c) ]. The result is that, in both cases, for not exceedingly high values of the error factor, the useful region is obviously reduced but, crucially, the possibility of achieving detectable broadcast via our protocol is still guaranteed in a broad range of values of the parameters. Specifically, as somehow expected, the error model in which σ is proportional to the measurement outcome results in a more consistent modification (shrinkage) of the useful surface, while almost nothing happens in the case of fixed, small σ. In particular, upper bounds on x 0 arise for a practical realization in the presence of a proportional error, or in other words due to a limited efficiency in the detection. A significant portion of the parameter space anyway remains valid for a workable implementation of the primitive. Our scheme is thus robust also with respect to the imperfections in the quadrature measurements. We draw the conclusion that the protocol we designed is truly efficient and realistically implementable in non-ideal conditions. Fig. 3 explicitly depictsp, Eq. (14), for sensible resource values of a = 3/2 and n = 2, as a function of x 0 and ∆, and according to different values of σ like in Fig. 2 . We notice a huge (unbounded from above in the ideal case σ = 0) region in whichp → 1/3, yielding an efficient solution to detectable broadcast via our protocol. We have thus identified an optimal "work point" in terms of the parameters describing the shared Gaussian states, and we have defined the frontiers of application of our scheme in the laboratory practice. In this way, together with the explicit steps of the protocol presented in the preceding sections, we obtain a clear-cut recipe for a CV demonstration of detectable broadcast, which we hope can be experimentally implemented in the near future.
For the sake of completeness, let us mention that from Eq. (14) we analytically find thatp converges exactly to 1/3 only in the following limiting cases (for a given finite 14), as a function of the measurement outcome x0 for the sender and the shift ∆ of the measurement outcomes for the receivers, for realistically mixed Gaussian resource states with n = 2 and a = 3/2. The uncertainty in the homodyne detection is taken to be (a) σ = 0, (b) σ = 1, and (c) σ = |x0|/10. Detectable broadcast is efficiently solvable in the wide plateau region wherep → 1/3. All of the quantities plotted are dimensionless.
n and σ = 0): (i) a → ∞ with ∆ < 3x 0 ; (ii) x 0 → ∞ with a ≥ 5 √ 2/6; (iii) ∆ → ∞ with 1 < a ≤ 3/2.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have proposed a protocol to solve detectable broadcast with entangled continuous variables using Gaussian states and Gaussian operations only. Our algorithm relies on genuine multipartite entanglement distributed among the three parties, which specifically must share two copies of a three-mode fully symmetric Gaussian state. Interestingly, we have found that nevertheless not all entangled symmetric Gaussian states can be used to achieve a solution to detectable broadcast: A minimum threshold exists on the required amount of multipartite entanglement. We have moreover analyzed in detail the security of the protocol.
In its ideal formulation, our protocol requires that the parties share pure resource states, and that the outcomes of homodyne detections are perfectly coincident and not affected by any uncertainty; this however entails that our protocol achieves a solution with vanishing probability. To overcome such a practical limitation, we have eventually considered a more realistic situation in which the tripartite Gaussian resources are affected by thermal noise, and, more importantly, the homodyne detections are realistically imperfect, and there is a finite range of allowed values for the measurement outcomes obtained by the parties. We have thoroughly investigated the possibility to solve detectable broadcast via our protocol under these relaxed conditions. As a result, we have demonstrated that there exists a broad region in the space of the relevant parameters (noise, entanglement, measurement range, measurement uncertainty) in which the protocol admits an efficient solution. This region encompasses amounts of the required resources which appear attainable with the current optical technology (with a legitimate trade-off between squeezing and losses). We can thus conclude that a feasible, robust implementation of our protocol to solve detectable broadcast with entangled Gaussian states may be in reach. This would represent another important demonstration of the usefulness of genuine multipartite continuous-variable entanglement for communication tasks, coming to join the recent achievement of a quantum teleportation network [19] .
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